As the AI Summit unfolds in Delhi this week, India must necessarily navigate an unstated but inescapable tension: the aspiration for collective solutions in the development of artificial intelligence on the one hand, and the imperative of protecting national interests in a world of geopolitical rivalry.
This tension is hardly new. It has marked the geopolitics of every transformative technology. But the scale and scope of artificial intelligence—its capacity to reshape economies, militaries, and political systems—make the clash between universalism and national advantage sharper than ever before.
No nation can afford to treat AI merely as a public good. Consequently, the calls for international cooperation at the summit coexist uneasily with the cold pursuit of national interest. The event’s soaring rhetoric on global governance cannot mask the strategic calculations of its principal participants—India included."
How, then, does Delhi manage this contradiction?
"India has traveled this road before. In 1955, at the height of the Cold War, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha presided over the first UN Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. His challenge then—balancing global scientific exchange with India’s sovereign security—is the exact blueprint Delhi requires for the AI age."
The world then, like now, was divided by an intense technological rivalry between the great powers. If the US-China conflict dominates the AI landscape today, it was the US-Soviet contest that defined the nuclear age.
In 1955, Bhabha sought to direct the conversation at the Geneva Conference towards cooperative development. He made the case for developing countries gaining access to advanced technologies, at a time when the idea sounded quaint. He argued that atomic energy could help developing nations leapfrog into modernity.
At Geneva, India positioned itself as a bridge-builder: committed to peaceful uses, supportive of global norms, and eager to cultivate indigenous capability. Bhabha also understood a central truth of technological geopolitics: only those who build national capacity can meaningfully shape global regimes.
This also recognised that international partnerships were indispensable in building such capacity. Bhabha’s deep connections with Western scientific networks ensured early cooperation from the United States, Canada, Britain, and France in establishing India’s atomic foundations.
The parallels with today are striking. India is investing in domestic AI capabilities even as it deepens collaboration with the United States and other advanced economies. American technology firms are deeply embedded in India’s digital ecosystem. Indian engineers populate Silicon Valley. US firms invest heavily in research and development centres across India. External partnerships and internal capability-building are proceeding in tandem.
There is also a cautionary tale. India’s early ambition to bridge the atomic divide faltered after the deaths of Nehru and Bhabha in the mid 1960s A misreading of the geopolitics of nuclear technology contributed to India’s atomic isolation by the mid-1970s.
The domestic programme stagnated, and India could do little to assist the broader developing world. Meanwhile, countries such as China and South Korea, which entered civilian nuclear development much later than India, built competitive industries and today dominate reactor exports to the Global South.
India cannot afford a similar confused drift in AI. Focusing on national interest does not mean abandoning the universalist strand in India’s foreign policy or its commitment to solidarity with the
Global South. The real challenge is to connect domestic capability with international responsibility.
It is important to remember that a large part of the Global South resides within India itself. If Delhi can use AI to accelerate domestic development, it would automatically lift up the Global South and transfer the model to other parts of the world.
The Delhi Summit thus confronts a threefold imperative. First, accelerate national capability—expand compute capacity, strengthen research ecosystems, train skilled manpower, and provide regulatory clarity. Second, deepen international partnerships, especially with the United States and other advanced economies, without foreclosing engagement with others. Third, contribute substantially to debates on the global governance of AI, grounded in practical experience rather than mushy rhetoric.
The United States-China contest is bound to intensify in the years ahead. Export controls, non-proliferation norms, and industrial subsidies will proliferate. Battles over standards and supply chains will sharpen. India cannot transcend this rivalry through moral exhortation alone. The objective must be to expand national options by leveraging the international dynamics.
The geopolitics of AI will reward those who build at home, collaborate abroad, and engage responsibly in shaping the norms of a new technological era. For India, the task is not to choose between universalism and nationalism, but to weave them together — anchoring global ambition in national capability, and national ambition in a broader vision of shared progress.
C Raja Mohan is a contributing editor of The Indian Express. He is also associated with the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University and the Council for Strategic and Defense Studies, Delhi
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